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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problems of state
estimation and false data injection detection in smart grid when
the measurements are corrupted by colored Gaussian noise. By
modeling the noise with the autoregressive process, we estimate
the state of the power transmission networks and develop a
generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) detector for the detection
of false data injection attacks. We show that the conventional
approach with the assumption of Gaussian noise is a special
case of the proposed method, and thus the new approach has
more applicability. The proposed detector is also tested on an
independent component analysis (ICA) based unobservable false
data attack scheme that utilizes similar assumptions of sample
observation. We evaluate the performance of the proposed state
estimator and attack detector on the IEEE 30-bus power system
with comparison to conventional Gaussian noise based detector.
The superior performance of both observable and unobservable
false data attacks demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed
approach and indicates a wide application on the power signal
processing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power system relies on accurate measurements of
system topology and state variables to analyze real-time
system dynamics and maintain stable operation. However,
measurements collected by the supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) system are often corrupted by random
noises or missing data [1]. To recover accurate system variables
and detect potential bad data for system operation, robust
state estimation techniques are commonly used in the energy
management systems (EMS) [2].
However, as the smart grid brings in cybernetic integration
with the computerized communication network to the mod-
ern electrical power infrastructure, the industry and research
community have witnessed growing security concerns from
false data injection (FDI) attacks in state estimation [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7]. Due to the linear approximation in state
estimation, malicious attackers can construct stealth schemes
to inject random or targeted false data into the power system
measurements that can result in serious instability in system
operation.
Although numerous studies have investigated the mathe-
matical methods to build robust state estimation and detection
mechanisms against the FDI attacks, they all are built on
a common assumption that the background noise in state
estimation are white Gaussian noise (WGN) [8], [9], [10].
However, many natural phenomena, such as ice cracking
and atmospheric noise, and man-made noise sources, such
as electronic devices, can be modeled more accurately as
non-Gaussian distributions [11][12]. Detection performance of
conventional state estimator and false data detector would
deteriorate due to the presence of colored Gaussian noise or
even more complex non-Gaussian noises.
In this paper, we investigate the problems of state estima-
tion and false data injection detection when the measurements
are corrupted by the colored Gaussian noise. We model the
colored Gaussian noise via the autoregressive (AR) process,
and derive a closed form of state estimation and a generalized
likelihood ratio test (GLRT) detector for false data injection
detection. This paper has shown the deterioration of conven-
tional WGN-based bad data detector in colored Gaussian noise
and proposed an AR-based detector. Moreover, it can be shown
that the conventional Gaussian noise approach is the special
case of the proposed AR approach. The computer simulations
on the IEEE 30-bus power system are conducted to evaluate
the detection performance of the proposed AR approach.
Throughout this paper, we use the boldfaced uppercase
character (e.g., X) to denote the matrix, the boldfaced low-
ercase character (e.g., x) to denote the vector, and the un-
boldfaced character (e.g., n or N ) to denote the scalar. The
symbols of [·]T and [·]−1 denote the transpose and the inverse
of a matrix, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
State estimations are performed on power transmission
networks which consist of a set of generators, load buses,
transmission lines, and other electrical facilities governed by
physical laws. Measurements are collected on meters, e.g.,
voltage meters and phasor measurement units (PMU), and
reported to wide-area control centers through the SCADA
system. The state variables of the power system is further
estimated at the control centers from these measurements with
the knowledge of power system topology. Control actions are
then determined to maintain stable, cooperative transmission
from power plants to customers in interconnected power grids.
Traditional state estimators are capable of identifying and
eliminating bad data from state estimations [13][14]. However,
it has been recently found that malicious data attacks can
exploit system topology information to construct false data
injection schemes that will bypass bad data detectors in con-
ventional state estimation [15][16][17]. A number of defending
strategies have been proposed [18], [19], [20]. Studies also
proposed optimal PMU placement to detect FDIs in the smart
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grid. Recently, machine learning algorithms have also been in-
troduced to detect stealth phases [21]. These studies, however,
are based on the assumption of white Gaussian noise embedded
in the measurements. Their performance remains unknown in
the presence of a colored-Gaussian or non-Gaussian noise.
In this paper, an AR detector is proposed and tested for
temporally colored Gaussian noise in state estimators to detect
random false data injection in the smart grid.
State Estimation: The state estimation is first proposed by
F. Schweppe in 1970[22], [23], [24] as a weighted least-squares
(WLS) problem. It is since enriched by numerous studies in the
following decades [25], [26], [27]. For a power system with
K state variables θ = [θ1, θ2, . . . , θK ]T , we have M meter
measurements x = [x1, x2, . . . , xM ]T , which is given by
x = Hθ + w (1)
where H is a M ×K (M > K) Jacobian topological matrix
and w is a M × 1 measurement error (noise) vector. The state
variables typically include the amplitudes and the phases of
voltages in buses. Commonly, the measurement error is mod-
eled by the white Gaussian distribution, i.e., w ∼ N (0,Σw).
For this case, it is well-known that the estimated state θˆ can
be given by the same solution using maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) and weighted least squares (WLS) [28], as
follows:
θˆ = (HTΣ−1w H)
−1HTΣ−1w x (2)
Detection of False Data Injection: False data injection
has been recently identified as a critical type of malicious data
attacks in a power system [29], [30], [31]. It is necessary
to detect the false data injection to protect the safety and
the integrity of the power system. Technically, the false data
injection can be modeled as follows:
x = Hθ + a + w (3)
where a is the false data injected to the measurements. a is
usually a sparse vector due to the fact that the attacker can only
get access to a limited number of component measurements in
power system. We call a vector a has sparsity of d if there are
at most D non-zero elements in the vector, i.e., ‖a‖0 = D. For
power engineers, both the state variables θ and the false data
a in Eq. (3) are unknown. Note that the false data with the
form of a = Hθa cannot be detected without knowing prior
knowledge of state variables, commonly termed unobservable
false data. Attackers may fabricate such attacks by gaining
intelligence on the system topology H. Mathematically, the
following theorem further indicates whether a false data is
observable:
Theorem 1. For a given measurement matrix H with a size of
M ×K, where M > K, there always exists a M × (M −K)
matrix B such that the columns of B span the orthogonal
subspace of the columns of H, i.e., BTH = 0 and BTB = I.
Then any false data a ∈ RM can be written as: a = Hθa +
Bθb, where θa ∈ RK and θb ∈ RM−K .
The proof of Theorem 1 follows the Orthogonal Decom-
position Theorem [32] directly. From Theorem 1, it can be
shown that the false data is observable when θb 6= 0, and θa
is part of state which is estimated as θˆ = θ + θa. Defining a
new state variable as θ1 = θ + θa, the measurements can be
further written as: x = Hθ1 + Bθb + w, and the hypothesis
testing problem for the false data injection detection becomes:
H0 : θb = 0
H1 : θb 6= 0 (4)
For the measurements corrupted by the noise w ∼ N (0, I),
we give the following GLRT detector for the hypothesis testing
problem in Eq. (4):
Theorem 2. For the given measurement x = Hθ1 +Bθb+w,
where both θ1 and θb are unknown, w ∼ N (0, I), BTH = 0
and BTB = I, the GLRT detector for the hypothesis testing
problem in Eq. (4) is to decide H1 if
T (x) = 2 ln
p(x; θˆ1, θˆb)
p(x; θˆ1,0)
= xTP⊥Hx > τ (5)
where τ is the threshold, P⊥H = I−H(HTH)−1HT , and θˆ1
and θˆb are given by
θˆ1 = (H
TH)−1HTx
θˆb = B
Tx (6)
The proof of Theorem 2 is provided in the Appendix of this
paper. To apply Theorem 2 for false data injection detection
with w ∼ N (0,Σw), we first define a pre-whitened variable
y = Mx where M is the known whitening transformation
matrix such that MTM = Σ−1w , and H
′ = MH. We then have
y = H′θ + a′ + w′, where a′ = Ma and w′ = Mw. Using
the pre-whitening transformation, we have w′ ∼ N (0, I).
According to the Theorem 1, there always exists a matrix B′
such that B′TH′ = 0 and B′TB′ = I, and a′ = H′θa+B′θb.
Thus, we have y = H′(θ + θa) + B′θb + w′. According to
the Theorem 2, hence, we have the following GLRT detector
for the false data injection detection:
T (y) = yT (I−H′(H′TH′)−1H′T )y
= xTMT (I−H′(H′TH′)−1H′T )Mx
= xT (I−Σ−1w H(HTΣ−1w H)−1HT )Σ−1w x
(7)
Sequential Observations: In FDI attacks, an adversary
usually hacks the meter measurements for a period of time to
mislead the decision making in power systems. The Cramer-
Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) theorem indicates that using mul-
tiple observations leads to a much lower variance of the state
estimation. Given N sequential observations, the estimated
state in power system can be written as:
θˆ = (HTΣ−1w H)
−1HTΣ−1w x¯ (8)
where x¯ =
∑N
i=1 xi/N is the mean of N observations, and
the GLRT detector for an unknown false data can be given by
T (X) =
2
N
ln
p(X; θˆ1, θˆb)
p(X; θˆ1,0)
= x¯T (I−Σ−1w H(HTΣ−1w H)−1HT )Σ−1w x¯ (9)
Here, we assume that the false data is a targeted measure-
ment vector that the attacker intends to inject over the N
observations. It can be further extended to state-dependent or
random but disruptive vectors under complex attack schemes.
The variation of states is also negligible during the period of
N observations. As a simplification of complex power system
dynamics, this steady-state assumption is commonly used in
many studies on DC state estimation and contingency analysis
[33][34]. To further validate this assumption, we provide more
simulation results in the Supplemental Material with dynamic
loading change in the system.
III. PROPOSED STATE ESTIMATOR AND FALSE DATA
DETECTOR WITH COLORED GAUSSIAN NOISE
We consider the problems of both state estimation and false
data detection in power systems when the measurements are
corrupted by the colored Gaussian noise which is modeled by
an AR process, and the conventional estimator and detector
with the Gaussian noise can be considered as the special case
of our methodology. The observation matrix X can be rewritten
as X = [x1,x2, . . . ,xM ]T , and the measurement error (noise)
matrix W can be rewritten as W = [w1,w2, . . . ,wM ]T ,
where both xi and wi are N × 1 vectors. For a power system
without false data injection, we have
xi = 1Nh
T
i θ + wi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M (10)
where hTi is the i-th row of H = [h1,h2, . . . ,hM ]
T , and
1N is a N × 1 all-ones vector. Unlike the existing approaches
with the assumption of white Gaussian noise, we consider that
the sequential noise wi = [wi,0, wi,1, . . . , wi,N ]T for the i-
th meter measurement follows a colored Gaussian distribution
which is modeled via a p-order AR process:
wi,n =
p∑
j=1
αi,jwi,n−j + vi,n, n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 (11)
where αi,1, αi,2, . . . , αi,p are the parameters of the AR pro-
cess, and vi,n is an independent and identically distributed
(I.I.D.) random variable which satisfies a white Gaussian
distribution, i.e., vi,n ∼ N (0, σ2i ). It is known that wi,n
and wi are also Gaussian. Given wi,−1, wi,−2, . . . , wi,−p, it
can be shown that the N sequential observations of the i-
th measurement have a probability density function (PDF)
p(xi;θ) [35][36] as follows:
p(xi;θ) =
N−1∏
n=0
p(xi,n|xi,n−1, xi,n−2, . . . , xi,n−p)
=
1
(2piσ2i )
N/2
exp
− 12σ2i
N−1∑
n=0
wi,n − p∑
j=1
αi,jwi,n−j

(12)
where the exponential term in above equation can be rewritten
as
N−1∑
n=0
wi,n − p∑
j=1
αi,jwi,n−j
 = (Tiwi + c)T (Tiwi + ci)
= (Tixi + ci −Ti1NhTi θ)T (Tixi + ci −Ti1NhTi θ)
(13)
where Ti is given by
Ti =

αi,0 0 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
−αi,1 αi,0 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
. . .
...
−αi,p −αi,p−1 · · · α0 · · · · · · 0
0 −αi,p −αi,p−1 · · · αi,0 · · · 0
. . .
...
0 · · · · · · −αi,p −αi,p−1 · · · αi,0

(14)
and ci is given by
ci =
[
−
p∑
k=1
αi,kx[−k],−
p∑
k=2
αi,kx[−k], . . . ,−αi,px[−p], 0, . . . , 0
]T
(15)
Therefore, it can be shown that Tixi + ci ∼
N (Ti1NhTi θ, σ2i I). For all M measurements, we have the
PDF p(X;θ) as follows:
p(X;θ) =
M∏
i=1
p(xi;θ) (16)
and the log-likelihood J(θ) as follows:
J(θ) = log p(X;θ)
= −
M∑
i=1
1
2σ2i
(Tixi + ci −Ti1NhTi θ)T (Tixi + ci −Ti1NhTi θ)
(17)
State Estimation: For a power system without false data
injection, using the maximum likelihood estimation criterion,
we have the following the state estimation solution
θˆ = arg max
θ∈Θ
J(θ)
=
(
M∑
i=1
1TNT
T
i T1N
σ2i
hih
T
i
)−1( M∑
i=1
1TNT
T
i (Tixi+ci)
σ2i
hi
)
(18)
Let A = diag(a1/σ21 , a2/σ
2
2 , . . . , aM/σ
2
M ) be a M × M
diagonal matrix, where ai = 1TNT
T
i T1N for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
and a M × 1 vector z = [z1/σ21 , z2/σ22 , . . . , zM/σ2M ]T , where
zi = 1
T
NT
T
i (Tixi + ci) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , Eq. (18) can be
rewritten as
θˆ = (HTAH)−1HT z (19)
Detection of False Data Injection: Following the Theorem
1 and 2, we first define a pre-whitened variable y = Mx,
where MTM = A, and define H′ = MH = [h1′, . . . ,hM ′]T .
Since A is a diagonal matrix, M is also a diagonal matrix
and M = diag(
√
a1/σ1, . . . ,
√
aM/σM ). According to the
Theorem 1, the i-th measurement with false data injection
can be written as yi = 1Nh
′T
i θ1 + 1Nb
′T
i θb + wi
′, where
b
′T
i hi
′ = 0 and b
′T
i bi
′ = 1, and wi′ is still modeled by the
AR process as follows:
wi,n
′ =
p∑
j=1
αi,jw
′
i,n−j + v′i,n, n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 (20)
where v′i,n ∼ N (0, ai). Hence, it can be shown that Tiyi +
ci ∼ N (Ti1Nh′Ti θ1 + Ti1Nb
′T
i θb, aiI). The MLEs of θ1
and θb can be given by
θˆ1 = (H
′TH′)−1H′T z′ (21)
θˆb = B
′T z′ (22)
where z′ = [z′1/a1, . . . , z′M/aM ]
T and z′i = 1
T
NT
T
i (Tiyi +
ci) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Hence, for the hypothesis testing
problem in Eq. (4), we have the following GLRT detector for
the false data injection detection:
T (Y) =
2
N
ln
p(Y; θˆ1, θˆb)
p(Y; θˆ1,0)
=
1
N
z′T (I−H′(H′TH′)−1H′T )z′ (23)
Note that the conventional Gaussian solution can be consid-
ered as a special case in our AR solution, since the distribution
modeled by the AR(0) process is just the white Gaussian
distribution. It can be verified that, for the AR(0) process, we
have T = I, M =
√
NΣ
−1/2
w , c = 0, and z′ = NMx¯,
and thus the conventional Gaussian solution for false data
estimation given by Eq. (9) is equivalent to our AR solution
given by Eq. (23).
Detection of Unobservable False Data Injection: The
GLRT detector derived from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 above
has an underlying scenario that assumes the topological infor-
mation (Jacobian matrix H) is known to the operator/detector
but unknown to the attacker, and detector’s knowledge of both
H and X gains an advantage against such attacks. Utilizing this
advantage, it is also able to detect certain unobservable attack
schemes utilizing the knowledge of observation matrix X.
In [37][19], the authors proposed an unobservable attack
scheme that does not rely on the knowledge H. Instead, the
linear independent component analysis (ICA) based scheme
only requires a number of sequential measurements at the
steady-state, i.e., the observation matrix X, to bypass tradi-
tional Gaussian detectors. The idea is to rewrite Hθ as HAy,
where A is the unknown mixing matrix and y is the source
vector of independent latent variables (components). Then, let
G = HA, we have X = Hθ + w = Gy + w. In a noise-free
scenario, ICA infers both G and y so that X = Gy with
maximal independency/nongaussianity in y. G has the same
number of rows as H, and its columns correspond to the
estimated independent components in y; the rows of y contain
the independent components and the columns correspond to
the N sequential observations. The inferred y is also called
quasi-state vector.
In the context of state estimation, when the system dy-
namics changes within a small range, |X−Gy| will be
sufficiently smaller than a trivial number [37]. In this scenario,
even without knowledge of the actual Jacobian matrix H, the
attacker can use the virtual Jacobian matrix G to generate false
data with Gδy, where δy = θa is the false state in Theorem 1.
Such attacks pose threat to the power system state estimation,
and they provide an alternative way when the attackers could
not gain access to the entire grid topology but a few snapshots
of the system measurements are available.
Practically, the FastICA algorithm[38][39] is used to com-
pute the two matrices G and y.Given a threshold ε and
an initial weight vector w of projection y = wTz, FastICA
maximizes the nongaussianity of y by iteratively updating w
and computing G from wTG = I, where I is the identity
matrix. The number of independent components is initially
set to the number of samples and iteratiely reduced if certain
component has an eigenvalue smaller than a threshold.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS
A. Detection Performance
We conduct numerical simulations on the IEEE 30-bus
power system to evaluate the detection performance for false
data injection. We use MATPOWER, a Matlab package for
power system simulation [40], to extract the measurement
matrix H which has the size of 284 × 60. There are 60
states in total which are the voltage amplitudes and angles
on the 30 buses, and 284 meter measurements in all buses and
branches. For the simplicity of our simulations, we simulate
that the noises of all measurements in both observable and
unobservable attacks have the same AR process: ei,n =
0.9× ei,n−1 + vi,n, where vi,n ∼ (0, σ2) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M
and n = 1, 2, . . . , N (M = 284 and N = 20 are used in our
simulations), and the constant false data with the magnitude
of A is injected into D random meter measurements (i.e.,
‖a‖0 = D). All simulation results reported in this section are
averaged over 10, 000 independent runs.
For the observable attacks, we consider that 10% meter
measurements (i.e., D = 29) can be manipulated by the
attackers and that the magnitude of the constant false data
is fixed at A = 1. Fig. 1 shows the receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves of the AR detector and the Gaussian
detector when σ2 = 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7. It can be shown
that the performance of the Gaussian detector is degraded
when the assumption of Gaussian noise is not satisfied. The
superior performance of the AR detector further demonstrates
the effectiveness of the proposed approaches.
For the ICA-based unobservable attacks, we consider all
measurements are attackable and compare different combina-
tions of σ2 and σ2y in three cases. Using the same setup for
other parameters, the detection performances of unobservable
false data attack are shown in Fig. 2. The AR detector shows
competitive performance over the Gaussian detector against
different σ2y with a given σ
2 (Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b) and remains
robust against different σ2 with a given σ2y (Fig. 2b and
Fig. 2c). The performance of Gaussian detector deteriorates
significantly in unobservable attacks when the inference of
virtual Jacobian matrix and quasi-state vector by the ICA based
scheme.
B. Robustness Analysis
From both the attack and defense perspective, the power
system is assume to hold a steady-state for the duration of
N samples. With N = 20 in a PMU-equipped power system,
this duration will be less than half a second at a rate of 48
samples per second. In practice, this assumption usually holds
when the system dynamics remain within a certain range.
In the following simulations, we verify that the assumption
of constant states for a short period of time does not reduce the
performance of state estimation (SE) and false data injection
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Fig. 1. Comparison of ROC curves in observable attacks when: (a) σ2 = 0.3, A = 1, and D = 29; (b) σ2 = 0.5, A = 1, and D = 29; (c) σ2 = 0.7,
A = 1, and D = 29
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Fig. 2. Comparison of ROC curves in ICA-based unobservable attacks when: (a) σ2 = 0.3, σ2y = 0.3, A = 1; (b) σ
2 = 0.3, σ2y = 0.5, A = 1; (c) σ
2 = 0.7,
σ2y = 0.5, A = 1.
(FDI) detection, if the system loading changes within a small
range. This assumption commonly holds in the study of
FDI [19]. More specifically, we show that the performance
difference of both SE and FDI methods for a constant full
system load and a dynamic system load is small enough to be
negligible.
1) State Variation with Dynamic Load: We first perform
computational simulations to illustrate the small variation of
state variables with the change of a power system’s load. The
states of an AC power system, including the amplitude and
the phase of voltages in buses, are determined by the system
loading which is usually varied in a small range in practice
for a short period of time. For the IEEE 30-bus power system,
we obtain 100 operating points whose overall load demand are
between 95% to 105% of the original benchmark. The accurate
states are then calculated by AC-OPF. We show the variation
of states with the dynamic loading in the boxplot of Fig. 3.
The state variation is small in the dynamic load.
Next, we consider N sequential meter measurements that
are corrupted with white Gaussian noise and apply the least
square state estimator of the Gaussian approach given by
Eq. (8) in our manuscript to estimate the states for two
operating points: one is the original base case with 100% load,
and another dynamic loading case with a random total load
between 95% to 105% of the base case. The results of all rest
simulations are averaged over 10,000 runs. In each run, we
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Fig. 3. The variations of 60 states when the system loading ranges from
95% to 105% for the IEEE 30-bus power system.
obtain N = 20 sequential observations: xi, i = 1, 2, · · · , 20
where xi is a meter measurement vector at i-th time frame.
Given these sequential observations of meter measurements,
we apply Eq. (8) in our manuscript to estimate the state θˆ,
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Fig. 4. (a). SE performance variations for two operating points, where the dynamic system loading ranges from 95% to 105%; (b). The difference between
two MSEs.
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Fig. 5. FDI detection performance variations and comparisons between the
Gaussian and AR detectors, where the dynamic system loading ranges from
95% to 105% for the IEEE 30-bus power system.
and calculate the MSE of meter measurements as follows:
MSE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖xi −Hθˆ‖ (24)
The MSEs of the base case and the dynamic case are
shown in Fig. 4, when different variances of Gaussian noise
are examined. It shows that the difference of MSEs for these
two settings of a power system is small and verifies that the
performance of state estimation with the Gaussian noise does
not reduce by modeling the dynamic load ranging from 95%
to 105% as a constant full load.
2) False Data Injection Detection with Dynamic Load: We
further evaluate the performance variation for FDI detection
when the dynamic loading ranges from 95% to 105%. We con-
sider the meter measurements are corrupted by the same type
of colored Gaussian noise in our manuscript which is modeled
as the following AR process: ei,n = 0.9×ei,n−1 +vi,n, where
vi,n ∼ (0, σ2) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M and n = 1, 2, . . . , N
(M = 284 and N = 20 are used in our simulations). The
same false data with the magnitude of A is injected into D
random meter measurements (i.e., ‖a‖0 = D). All simulation
results are averaged over 10, 000 runs.
For the simulations, we consider that 10% of meter mea-
surements (i.e., D = 29) can be manipulated by the attackers
and that the magnitude of the constant false data is fixed at
A = 1. We compare our AR FDI method given by Eq. (22)
in our manuscript with the Gaussian FDI method given by
Eq. (9) for the base case and dynamic loading case. We show
the area under the ROC curve (AUC) performance of these
two approaches in Fig. 5, when the dynamic system load is
considered as a constant full system load. It also shows that
the performance variation is small enough to be negligible for
both Gaussian and AR FDI detection approaches.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper considered the problems of state estimation and
false data detection in power systems, when the measurements
are corrupted by the colored Gaussian noise. By modeling the
colored Gaussian noise with the autoregressive process, we
developed a state estimator and a false data detector to address
these two problems. Numerical simulations were performed to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods. The
superior performance of the proposed AR detector demon-
strated the potential of AR detector against false data injection
attacks in both observable and unobservable cases when the
real Jacobian matrix remains secure and confidential to the
attackers. In our future work, data-driven machine learning
algorithm such as support vector machine [41] and nearest
neighbor [42] will be studied to incorporate the proposed
model-driven state estimation methods for FDI detection.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Theorem 2: For the given measurement x = Hθ1 +
Bθb + w, where both θ1 and θb are unknown, w ∼ N (0, I),
BTH = 0 and BTB = I, the GLRT detector for the following
hypothesis testing problem
H0 : θb = 0
H1 : θb 6= 0 (25)
is to decide H1 if
T (x) = 2 ln
p(x; θˆ1, θˆb)
p(x; θˆ1,0)
= xTP⊥Hx > τ (26)
where τ is the threshold, P⊥H = I−H(HTH)−1HT , and θˆ1
and θˆb are given by
θˆ1 = (H
TH)−1HTx
θˆb = B
Tx (27)
proof: Since w ∼ N (0, I), we have x ∼ N (Hθ1 + Bθb, I).
The log-likelihood of of x is given by
J(θ1,θb) = −1
2
(x−Hθ1 + Bθb)T (x−Hθ1 + Bθb) + c
(28)
where c is a constant.
Using the maximum likelihood estimation criterion, both
θ1 and θb can be estimated as follows
∂J(θ1,θb)
∂θ1
= 0
∂J(θ1,θb)
∂θb
= 0 (29)
which leads to
θˆ1 = (H
TH)−1HTx
θˆb = B
Tx (30)
The GLRT detector can be written as
T (x) = 2 ln
p(x; θˆ1, θˆb)
p(x; θˆ1,0)
= xT (I−H(HTH)−1HT )x > τ (31)
where τ is the threshold. If T (x) > τ , then we accept H1,
otherwise we accept H0.
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